From this point of view, practical morality is not only about how to treat others, but also about what to do? Therefore, no categorical distinction is made here between “moral” reasons and other types of reasons, such as prudential reasons. There are, of course, many distinctions that we can make, especially between guiding reasons (which actually apply to an action – Raz 1990: 16ff) and explanatory reasons (by which the agent is subjectively motivated). This essay deals with the guiding reasons – that is, the reasons why we should or shouldn`t do something. But in this area, the reasons, whether prudent, altruistic or otherwise, are either good – that is, valid – reasons to do something, or they are not. These narrower labels are significant, but they are not fundamental to the moral question, what is to be done? Obviously, different types of reasons may have different weightings and priorities; What we call “moral” reasons, especially in relation to the interests of others, often have a relatively greater meaning. But a reason that has a cautious character, for example, can always be a good reason to do something. Recklessness can also be a vice. Imagine the case of a successful patriotic businessman who decides to commit suicide if Britain misbehaves at the next Eurovision Song Contest. He can rightly be morally criticized by his friends for deciding to “throw away” his life on such a stupid basis.

The introduction of “insult” and certain types of paternalism as potentially legitimate reasons makes it a bit misleading to speak of the “harm principle” as a principle shared by all the great thinkers associated with the principle. I will continue to do so only as a shortcut. The table below illustrates some of the differences in the views of the leading thinkers associated with the harm principle regarding the reasonable limits of lawful coercion. None of them has a narrative with exactly the same conclusions as the others. The most influential recent defense of the “harm principle” – by a theorist with a reasonable explanation of morality – is that of Joseph Raz (Raz, 1986). [5] I will discuss in a moment the basis of the principle of damages proposed by Raz. But first, a word about the original basis of Mill`s principle. Mill said utility was the ultimate attraction in all ethical matters. But given other things Mill says about it, it`s first amazing why he should think utility supports the harm principle. For he also enunciated the principle of utility, according to which “actions are proportionately just because they tend to promote happiness, bad because they tend to produce the opposite of happiness” (Mill 1993, p. 7). The latter formulation seems to advise States to keep their options open in their legislation.

“Do what you can to reverse unhappiness,” seems to be the advice, “and do what you can to promote happiness.” “Coercion to avoid harming others, if it reverses the misfortune; Coercion for other purposes, if that also serves the purpose. But, as we have just seen, coercion to prevent harmless misconduct is ruled out by Mill, whether or not such a measure is the best choice of the state to reverse the misfortune. It doesn`t matter if this harmless injustice makes everyone unhappy; It does not matter whether the coercion of those who maintain it would remove misery: the state must not exercise coercion and misery must remain. Did the confusion here produce Mill`s masterpiece? I therefore believe that it is not possible to set theoretical limits on the power of the state to legislate against immorality. It is not possible to establish in advance exceptions to the general rule or to insistently define areas of morality in which the law must in no way interfere. (For simplicity`s sake, I will focus primarily on the application of criminal law. However, as discussed below, similar principles apply to coercion by civil law.) The first thesis, that moral injustice is not sufficient to justify criminalization, does not seem controversial. Even Devlin could accept it.

Suppose φing should not be performed. Also accept for now that this creates a reason to ban it. It does not follow that, on the whole, we should prohibit φing, because the reason for the ban can be nullified by other considerations. Even if the apparently very strong concession in (1) is made to the legal moralist, the question is far from over. Indeed, limits of principle can be generated from the means proposed by the law to achieve its objectives. (2), not (1), leads Raz to support the principle of damage. At first glance, it seems strange that a supporter of the claim referred to in subsection (1) could also be a supporter of the harm principle. After all, isn`t the principle specifically intended to impose limits of principle on the law and to exclude justifications based on the goodness or value of options? How do we reconcile this with the assertion that there are no fundamental limits to the state`s pursuit of moral goals? One big concern is that it hasn`t helped us at all. The idea is that the law should not use controversial premises about the good to make laws. Take, for example, a legislator, perhaps a religious one, who supports the opinion of a small minority that personality begins from the moment of conception and on that basis enacts a law declaring abortion illegal.

This is exactly the kind of movement that Nagel and Rawls want to exclude. A controversial viewpoint like this has no place to legislate for the public that is supported by coercion. Whether or not it is metaphysically true that personality begins from the moment of conception, such a vision should be firmly closed. The perfectionist denies, as we have seen, that there is anything in the very nature of morality that should set fundamental limits to the pursuit by law of moral ends: such limits are supposed to penetrate through the back door, through reflection on the nature of coercion. The purpose of the last section was to examine the latter point of view. However, many question the earlier view, arguing that there is something in the very nature of human morality that should lead us to conclude that there are principled limits of law. Above all, it is said, the fact of persistent moral disagreements should push us in this direction. As Rawls argued, it is not reasonable to believe that moral disagreements will disappear in the medium or even long term. And much of this disagreement cannot simply be blamed on the anemia of some or those who are biased in favor of themselves, their families, or groups. If it were possible, perhaps their views could be safely ignored. Rather, part of the disagreement stems from disagreements about what evidence is appropriate, what weight to give to the evidence, where it can be agreed, how priorities and decisions should be made among the wide range of possible values, and so on.

Rawls describes such factors as “the burden of judgment” (Rawls 1993, 56-57). This kind of disagreement is not unreasonable, and perhaps morality itself can prescribe a self-renunciation prescription against forcing people to step out of their reasonable (perhaps false) opinions. A society needs its morality as it needs a government, and so it has the right, for the sake of self-protection, “to use the law to preserve morality in the same way it uses it to protect all that is essential to its existence” (Devlin 1965, p. 11). So, for Devlin, it is not just “rude” and “short” when he says, as the Wolfendon Committee does, that there is an area of morality and immorality that is not a question of law; This is simply not true. The law must do what it must do to demand the price of society, which is the protection of the morality of this society. Depending on views on the extent of morality, it is possible to narrow the gap. Michael Moore (1997:662), for example, rejects the idea that morality has anything to say about consensual sexual practices. Therefore, even from its retributivist point of view, the state has no reason to criminalize such activities.